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THE MEANING OF CESSATION OF PRODUCTION:

HOYT V. CONTINENTAL OIL
By John S. Lowe

The Oklahoma Supreme Court may have
fashioned a club for lessors to use to bludgeon
lessees from what most lessees thought was a
shield for their protection in its decision in Hoyt v.
Continental Oil,' regarding the interpretation of
the cessation of production clause in an oil and gas
lease. There can be legitimate dispute, however, as
to the rule of law the court intended to adopt.
In Hoyt, the Oklahoma Supreme Court had
before it a typical cessation of production clause
that provided in relevant part that:
"If after expiration of the primary term ....
production shall cease from any cause ....
[the] lease shall not terminate provided ....
lessee resumes operations for drilling within
60 days." 2 .
The plaintiff, Hoyt, sued for cancellation of an oil
and gas lease alleging cessation of production in
paying quantities after expiration of the primary
term. Each month for a period of more than a year
operating revenues had totalled less than
operating expenses, while the defendant
renegotiated a gas sales contract and studied a
completion attempt in a new formation. The
plaintiff argued that the cessation of production
clause gave Continental Oil sixty days after cessation of production in paying quantities to act to
hold the lease by drilling operations.'
Continental Oil, on the other hand, argued that
the cessation of production clause in the lease
referred to a complete cessation of production, not
to a cessation of production in paying quantities. 4
The Oklahoma Supreme Court found in favor of
the plaintiff, Hoyt, holding that the reference to
production in the cessation of production clause
980

meant production "in paying quantities" after the
primary term. The court said the lease had terminated because defendant had failed to resume
operations within sixty days as required by the
terms of the clause."
The Supreme Court reasoned that, during the
primary term of the lease, the cessation of production clause modifies the drilling clause of the lease,
so that there is no cessation of production during
the primary term of the lease unless production
ceases entirely. The court then stated that after the
primary term has expired, the cessation of production clause modifies the habendum clause of the
lease.6 The cessation of production clause is triggered, therefore, by a failure of production in paying quantities in the secondary term.
The Hoyt case may be interpreted as having the
effect of transforming a clause that was intended
as a shield to protect the lessee against premature
termination of his producing lease into a club with
which a lessor can beat his lessee. This view results
from a literal reading of the words of the court in
Hoyt:
"..... where, as here, the primary term has
expired .

. .

. the effect of the provision is to

modify the habendum clause. In such a situation there is a cessation of production if the
habendum clause requires production in paying quantities and such requirement is not
met. [Citations omitted.] .

. .

. the record

clearly demonstrates production in paying
quantities was not obtained for an uninterrupted period far in excess of the 60 day provi@1981 John S. Lowe
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sion in the lease executed by the parties.
Where the parties have bargained for and
agreed on a time period for a temporary cessation clause that provision will control over the
common law doctrine of temporary cessation
allowing a 'reasonable time' for resumption of
drilling operations."' [Citations omitted.]
This, and the text that follows, suggest that the
Oklahoma Supreme Court may see the cessation
of production clause as supplanting the timeflexible standard of "in paying quantities."8
Continental Oil, in its petition for rehearing,
spelled out the implications of such a view:

.

"This application of the cessation of production clause would be especially difficult in
light of the fact that production figures for a
particular month are normally not available
for 15 to 20 days after the close of the month.
By the time the production figures were obtained from the well, and the profits and
losses figured, the 60 day period would have'
run. Even if it had not yet run, it would be virtually impossible to secure a drilling rig and a
drilling crew and have it on location within
the time provided in order to preserve the
lease ..... "

Another view of the case, one less threatening
to lessees and probably more in harmony with the
scanty case law in the area, is that Hoyt holds that
the cessation of production clause applies only
after it has been established that there has been a
cessation of production in paying quantities for.
more than a reasonable period of time. According
to this interpretation, after the lease is extended to
The Oklahoma Bar Journal

the secondary term, the lessee would be entitled to
hold the lease for a reasonable time during which
there was not production in paying quantities plus
an additional sixty days (or whatever period was
provided for by the clause).
Using this view of Hoyt, the cessation of producion clause can do the lessee no additional
harm where production costs exceed production
revenues for more than a reasonable period. On
the other hand, it does the lessee little good either,
for he cannot know when the sixty day period
begins to run. The operator will not be informed
of the trier of fact's determination until long after
the facts have established that his production ceased in paying quantities and long after any grace
period provided for in the cessation of production
clause has run.
It is this writer's opinion that a cessation of production clause similar to that before the court in
Hoyt should be interpreted to apply only where
there has been a total cessation of production; that
is, the reference to production in the cessation of
production clause ought not to be interpreted as a
reference to production in paying quantities. By
this view, the cessation of production clause
would simply be inapplicable to the Hoyt situation. Where operating costs exceeded operating
revenues for an unreasonable period of time, the
lease would terminate without reference to the
cessation of production clause.
The purpose of a cessation of production clause
is to bring a higher degree of certainty to an area
981

of the law otherwise couched in terms of
reasonableness. It saves both the lessee and the
lessor from having to argue about whether production has been shut down for an impermissibly
long period. It permits the lessee to take action to
re-establish production from a lease from which
production has ceased with substantial assurance
that he will not be later held to have invested his
funds in a lease that has already terminated.
Such a certain result would be desirable where
there was no total cessation, but merely a cessation of paying quantities. Because the concept of
paying quantities is inherently imprecise,
however, that is impossible. The intent of the parties, therefore, in including a cessation of production clause in the lease is likely to be that the cessation of production clause apply only where there
has been a total cessation of production.
Though this writer is convinced that reference
to cessation of "production" in the Hoyt cessation
of production clause should have been interpreted
to mean total cessation, it is clear that that interpretation was rejected by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court. Because of the risk that the Supreme Court
meant that cessation of production clauses that
refer to "if . . . . production shall cease" are triggered by a single accounting period loss after the
end of the primary term, lease draftsmen would be
well advised to use formulations that clearly state
that the reference to cessation of "production" in
the cessation of production clause is to total cessa-

tion. The following language from a Colorado
form should suffice:
"6. If at any time or times after the Primary
Term or before the expiration of the Primary
Term all operations, and if production, all
production shall cease for any cause, this
Lease shall not terminate if Lessee commences
or resumes any'drilling or re-working operations, or production, within ninety (90) days
after such cessation; provided that payment of
rental as herein provided for shall be resumed
if such cessation occurs during the Primary
Term, which rental shall be in addition to any
royalty paid."1o (Emphasis added.)
Not to do so is to risk being clubbed with one's
shield.
1. 606 P.2d 560 (Okla. 1980). For a somewhat different view of Hoyt, See Note, The Cessation of Production Clause and less than Paying Production in the
Secondary Term, 16 Tulsa L.J. 301 (1981)
2. Id. at 562.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 563.
5. Id.at 564.
6. Id. at 563.
7. Id.
8. Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 325 SW 2d 684, 10
0. & G. R. 1109 (1959).
9. Appellant's brief in support of petition for rehearing, at 15.
10: Form 681, approved for use in Colorado by the
American Association of Petroleum Landmen, published by Kraftbilt Products, Tulsa.
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LAW DAY EVENT
SET IN LAWTON

OCU LAW SCHOOL
ADDS TO FACULTY

As a special Law Day event,
Cameron University in Lawton
is sponsoring a debate on the
"Holy City" issue at 10 a.m.
on Friday May 1 in Shepler
Center. Stephen L. Pevar,
attorney for record for the suit
filed March 11, 1981 in the
United States District Court,
District of Columbia, Civil
Action No. 810580, will argue
for removal of all religious
symbols and Teree E. Foster,
OU College of Law faculty,
will argue for retention of the
Holy City as it currently exists
claiming that it does not
violate the Constitutional
amendment for the separation
of church and state.

John D. McCord III,
presently enrolled in the LL.M.
program at the University of
Georgia School of Law,
Athens, Ga., will join
Oklahoma City University's
School of Law faculty in
August as an Associate
Professor of law specializing in
the area of property. Mr.
McCord, a graduate of Emory
University, Atlanta, Ga.,
graduated cum laude from the
University of Georgia School
of Law. He previously was a
partner in the firm of Rogers &
McCord in Ashburn, Ga., and
also served as General Counsel
for the First Federal Savings &
Loan Association of Turner
County, Ashburn, Ga.

John D. Hastie, of the
Oklahoma City firm of Hastie
& Kirschner will be on the
teaching faculty of the ABA
National Institute of
"Financing Real Estate During
the Inflationary '80s" to be
held May 4 and 5 at the
Beverly Hilton in Beverly
Hills, Calif., and May 28-29 at
the New York Hilton, New
York. His topic will be "Joint
Ventures, Including Those
With Lending Institutions,
Non-taxpayers, Foreign
Entities, Pension Funds and
Preferred Equity
Transactions."

MID-YEAR MEETING
SET BY PT&C SECTION
June 12-14 are the dates of
the Mid-Year Continuing Legal
Education Conference set by
the OBA's Patent, Trademark
and Copyright Section. For
registration at the event to be
held at Shangri-La Lodge,
Afton, contact James R.
Duzan, P.O. Box 1431,
Duncan 73536.
R. N. Dunagan, III,
formerly Vice-President and
General Counsel, Energy
Decisions, Inc., has become a
member of the law firm of
Pierson, Ball & Dowd,
concentrating his practice in
the areas of energy law and
taxation. He will divide his
practice between the firm's
Washington, D.C. and
Oklahoma City offices which
are located at 204 N. Robinson
Avenue, 750 City National
Bank Tower.

John Terry Bado, formerly
Vice-President and General
Counsel for Alpha Energy of
Oklahoma City, and Barbara
K. Arentz Bado, formerly
Senior Law Clerk for United
States District Court Judge Lee
R. West, of the United States
District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma,
Oklahoma City, announce the
formation of a partnership to
practice law under the firm
name of Bado and Bado, with
offices at Suite 502 Canyon
Park, 1600 East Nineteenth
Street, Edmond 73034, (405)
340-1500.

OKLAHOMA ASSOCIATION OF MUNICIPAL ATTORNEYS PLAN CONFERENCE
Registration will begin at 9
a.m. in the OU Law Center, 300
Timberdell Road, in Norman on
Friday, May 8, for the 1981
Spring Conference of the Oklahoma Association of Municipal
Attorneys. The opening session
is set for 9:30 a.m. and at 10
a.m. Jim L. Lindsey, Tulsa, will
talk on "Increase of Municipal
Liability in General."
The Oklahoma Bar Journal

James G. Hamill, Oklahoma
City, will present the "Legislative Committee Report" at 11
a.m. Luncheon will be at 11:30
a.m. and at 12:30 p.m. Russell
D. Bennett, Lawton, will talk
on "Liability Under 42 USC Sec
1983".
At 1:30 p.m. David K. Petty,
Guymon, will speak on "Liabili-

ty Based on 42 USC Sec 1981";
at 2:30 p.m. Loyd L. Benson,
Frederick, will talk on "Liability
Based on Nuisance" and at 3:15
the "General Counsel's Report"
will be given by Maurice H.
Merrill, General Counsel, and
Lynn C. Rogers, Assistant
General Counsel. After the 3:30
p.m. adjournment a short Directors meeting will follow.
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